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 Rates of Return to Public Agricultural Research in 48 U.S. States. 
 
Abstract 
 The internal rate of return (IRR) to public investment in agricultural R&D 
is estimated for each of the continental U.S. states. Theoretically, our contribution 
provides a way of obtaining the returns to a local public good using Rothbart’s concept of 
virtual prices. Empirically, we use the spatial dependency among states generated by 
knowledge spillovers to define the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. We estimate an average 
own-state rate of 17% and a social rate of 29%. These figures should inform the policy 
debate on the allocation of federal funds to research in the actual food crisis environment. 
 
1. Introduction 
President Bush's proposed budget for fiscal year 2009 intends to boost federal 
investments in physical sciences through increased funding for research and development 
(R&D) at the Department of Energy's Office of Science, the National Science 
Foundation, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology's intramural 
program. However, the increased support for R&D in physical sciences comes at the 
expense of reduced funding for other agencies, namely the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Interior’s US Geological 
Survey agency, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Accounting for 
congressional earmarks in 2008, the USDA would see its R&D funding fall by 16% to 
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 $2.0 billion.3 In particular, funding for research and education activities under the 
Cooperative State, Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) would decline 
by 20%; and the federal science and technology budgets for the Agricultural Research 
Service and the Forest Research Service would decline, respectively, by 7.5% and 8% 
(American Association for the Advancement of Science 2008). 
This reduced support to agricultural research will have an impact on the 
productivity of the agricultural sector. The magnitude of the impact and its timing is 
debatable. The importance of this issue is highlighted by the international food crisis 
generated by high agricultural commodities prices due in big part to their use in biofuel 
generation.  It is as a result of this crisis that a re-examination of international 
investments in public agricultural R&D during the last forty years has revealed a decrease 
in support even when returns of Green Revolution technology had been high, playing an 
important part in today’s food crisis. 
The present study intends to contribute to the debate by providing an assessment 
of the benefits from public investment in agricultural R&D for each continental U.S. 
state, acknowledging in theory and empirics their local public goods nature. This is the 
first study to endogenously recover the impact of public investments in agricultural R&D 
for each of the 48 continental U.S. states while accounting for structural and stochastic 
dependency among the states due to knowledge spillovers.4 The assessment is conducted 
                                                 
3 The President’s proposed cut is due to the elimination of earmarked funds that are likely to be reinstated 
by Congress.  The House and Senate versions of the federal budget (as of June 20, 2008) would result, 
respectively, in an estimated 8% and 9% decrease in agricultural R&D with respect to fiscal year 2008 
(excluding earmarked funds). 
4 Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) analyzed the optimal allocation of public monies to agricultural 
R&D in the same 48 U.S. states considered in the present study with a joint production model of public and 
state-specific benefits. Spillovers were defined as contemporary expenditures in R&D in neighboring 
states, and state expenditures in R&D were endogenous to their problem. Given that the focus of the 
present study is on the impact of the stock of knowledge generated by public R&D on the cost structure of 
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 in terms of the Internal Rate of Return5 (IRR): the greater is the IRR, ceteris paribus, the 
more socially desirable it is to invest in public agricultural R&D. Any responsible policy 
discussion about the disposition of public funds should be based on knowledge of the 
private and social returns to such investment. We provide the estimates of the IRR to 
public investments in agricultural R&D for each U.S. state hoping in this way to 
contribute to the policy debate 
In addition to the policy contribution, we contribute to the literature by providing 
a general theory and a way of measuring the returns to a local public good using the 
concept of virtual prices.6 In assessing the benefits of public agricultural R&D, it is 
crucial to recognize its local public goods nature. Since there is no market for trading 
public goods, no market assessment of the value of public goods is readily available, and 
their value must be recovered endogenously. In addition, a local public good needs a 
definition of its ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. While some research results are fully usable 
only by the jurisdiction that incurred the costs of R&D some are also usable by other 
jurisdictions, giving rise to knowledge spillovers. Therefore, the major challenges for the 
researcher are: to estimate the returns to this public good and to do so by attributing the 
benefits from an investment in R&D to the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. Latimer and 
Paarlberg (1965) and Evenson (1967) have early indicated the potential distortion in the 
estimates of the contribution of public R&D to the agricultural sector due to the presence 
                                                                                                                                                 
the agricultural sector, and the fact that the stock of public R&D is constructed as a weighted average of 
past expenditures in R&D, public expenditures are exogenous to our model and spillovers are defined in 
terms of stocks of knowledge generated in neighboring states. 
5 The IRR is the rate of return that equals the discounted stream of benefits from an investment with its 
initial cost. 
6 A virtual price, introduced originally in demand theory by Rothbart (1941), is the price at which the 
consumer/producer, acting as a price taker, will choose to consume a specified bundle. 
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 of spillovers.7 It is in this sense that the researcher must define the jurisdiction under 
analysis. In this study, the benefits from an investment in R&D are estimated from the 
impacts of such investments on the production structure for two different levels of 
aggregation: the state where the investment was undertaken (the own state benefits), and 
the state and its geographical neighbors (the social benefits).8  
The researcher then must address the problems in estimation of the benefits of 
R&D, not only for the own state, but for all other states affected by the existence of 
spillover effects across them. Most of the studies on the effects of R&D are ad-hoc.  They 
include primal and dual approaches in which a variable representing the stock of own 
state R&D variable is included in a production function, cost function or on a two step 
regression of a productivity index to capture the own state benefits.  Some studies add an 
ad-hoc spill-in variable to capture the social benefits and to avoid the structural 
dependence problem among states due to the local public goods nature of the investment. 
But it is possible that knowledge generated in one state might benefit other states beyond 
the geographical limits imposed ad-hoc by researchers when defining the spill-in stocks. 
If this is the case, the residuals of the estimating model will contain relevant information 
and will be correlated among geographical units, generating cross-sectional stochastic 
dependence. One potential effect of ignoring such information, mentioned in Alston and 
Pardey (2001), is that “improper attribution of locational spillovers generates high and 
                                                 
7 White and Havlicek (1979) showed that failure to take into account geographical spillovers from U.S. 
regional agricultural research inflated the estimated rate of return to R&D in the Southern region by more 
than 25 percent. For a review of the economic impacts of agricultural R&D at sectoral and aggregate levels 
both for the U.S. and other countries, see Evenson (2001), Alston et al (2000), and Alston (2002). 
8 Huffman, Gopinath and Somwaru (2002) estimated the own state IRR to public expenditures in 
agricultural R&D for the “representative” Midwestern state to be 11% per annum, and a social rate of 
return of 43% per annum. Yee et al (2002) estimated the social rate of return to public agricultural research 
to be about 3.5 to 6.7 times the own state rate of return for the “representative” state in each of the seven 
regions defined in their study. 
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 very variable estimates of the rate of return to agricultural research.” In this study we will 
also explore this hypothesis by estimating these returns endogenously with information 
on spillover effects incorporated structural and stochastically. 
Theoretically, aggregate technology is represented by a variable cost function. 
The own-state stock of public R&D enters the variable cost as a fixed input of 
production. A spill-in variable is explicitly incorporated into the model to account for 
structural dependency among neighboring states. The virtual prices for the own-state of 
public R&D and the spill-in variables are endogenous to this problem and are recovered 
from the cost function following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) and Onofri and Fulginiti 
(2008). Measurement of these concepts is done econometrically by constructing and 
explicitly incorporating variables representing own state and spill-in stocks of R&D in 
the structure of the model.  Parameters of such a model are then used in the calculation of 
IRR’s.  These IRR’s then will include own state plus spill-in impacts of the R&D 
investment. The existence of stochastic spatial dependency and the extent of its 
propagation across states are tested with the Keleijian and Robinson (1992) test. The 
model with spatial autocorrelation (SAR) in the error structure is estimated with U.S. 
state-level annual data for the period 1949-1991 (Craig, Pardey and Acquaye, 2002) 
using generalized spatial three stage least squares (Keleijian and Prucha 2004). The 
resulting estimates from the spatial model are compared to the estimates from a non-
spatial model to assess the impact of stochastic spatial dependency on estimated IRRs. 
We expect that failing to correct for stochastic spatial dependency induced by knowledge 
spillovers would affect the definition of the appropriate jurisdiction and the magnitude of 
returns to R&D.  
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 The estimates of the IRR to public agricultural R&D are positive and significant 
for all states. The average own state IRR for the nation is estimated, in the spatial model, 
at 17%, while the average social IRR is estimated at 29%. In the non-spatial model these 
estimates are 12% and 14% higher, respectively. Distributions of estimates in both 
models for all states are available.  The returns estimated are very impressive,9 even 
though correcting for stochastic spill-ins in public agricultural research has resulted in 
lower IRR’s estimates than the few others found in the literature.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the economic model used to 
capture the virtual prices of a local public good is presented. It is shown then how these 
virtual prices are incorporated into the calculation of the own state and the social IRR’s 
and how the ‘appropriate jurisdictions’ are determined. The data used and the estimation 
procedure are described next, followed by a description of the results. A summary of the 
findings and their relevance is provided in the concluding section. 
 
2. The Model 
The unit of analysis, determined by the level of aggregation of the available data, 
is the state. We assume that each state produces an aggregate output, y, using variable 
inputs , fixed private inputs Nxxx ,,1 …= Mvvv ,,1 …= , and fixed public inputs 
. The vector of prices of the variable inputs is denoted by , 
with . Let 
QVVV ,,1 …= Nwww ,,1 …=
∑
=
=⋅
N
n
nn xwxw
1
( )Vvxfy ,,=  be the production function satisfying 
                                                 
9  During the same period, the average returns of the S&P500 was 9% and that of the NASDAQ composite 
index was 12%.  
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 monotonicity and weak essentiality in x. Let ( ) ( ){ }yVvxfxVvyB ≥= ,,:,,  be the closed, 
non-empty and convex restricted input requirement set to produce output y. Then, a well-
defined non-negative short-run variable cost function ( )Vvywc ,,,  exists which is non-
decreasing, concave, continuous and positively linearly homogeneous in w, and non-
decreasing in y (Chambers 1988): 
(1) ( ) ( ){ }VvyBxxwVvywc
x
,,:min,,,
0
∈⋅= ≥  
Furthermore, if is differentiable in w, it also satisfies Shephard’s lemma in w: ( Vvywc ,,, )
(2)  ( )Vvywcx w ,,,∇=
where x is the vector of cost-minimizing variable input demands, homogeneous of degree 
zero in w and with symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix ( )Vvywcx www ,,,∇=∇ . 
If is differentiable in v and V, Shephard’s lemma can be applied to fixed 
factors. For convenience, is assumed twice continuously differentiable in all 
its arguments. The monetary value placed by producers on marginal units of private fixed 
factors v, hereon referred to as the shadow value or virtual price Z
( Vvywc ,,, )
)( Vvywc ,,,
v, is represented by the 
amount of variable cost saved in the production of y due to the availability of an extra 
unit of v: 
(3)  ( )VvywcZ vv ,,,−∇=
In the short-run, Zv can be positive or negative, depending on the level of the private 
fixed factor with respect to its long-run optimum and on its disposability assumption. If 
the level of private fixed factor is below its long-run optimum, the variable cost function 
is expected to be decreasing in v (i.e., ) since the set of feasible combinations of 
(x, v, V) increases when an extra unit of v is available for production, so that new cost-
0>vZ
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 minimizing opportunities (previously unavailable) are opened up (Chambers 1988, p. 
102).10 If the private fixed factor is above its long-run optimum and it is freely disposable 
(i.e., it does not cost anything in terms of output or other inputs to get rid of the extra 
units above the optimal level), then the variable cost function is expected to be 
independent of v (i.e., ). However, if the private fixed factor is above its long-run 
optimum but it is not freely disposable (i.e., it is costly to dispose off the extra units), its 
shadow value is expected to take a negative sign (i.e., 
0=vZ
0<vZ ), indicating that an extra 
unit of the private fixed factor might actually increase short-run variable costs. Since we 
make no a priori assumption about the free disposability of private fixed inputs or their 
level with respect to their long-run optimum, we do not expect any particular sign for . vZ
The monetary value placed by producers on marginal units of public factors V, 
hereon referred to as the shadow value or virtual price ZV, is represented by the amount of 
variable cost saved in the production of y due to the availability of an extra unit of V: 
(4)  ( )VvywcZ VV ,,,−∇=
Similar to the shadow values of private fixed factors, the shadow values of public factors 
can be positive or negative, depending on their free disposability. While some public 
inputs might be freely disposable, (e.g. public roads that producers might choose not to 
use), some others are not (e.g. pollution). Since we make no a priori assumption about the 
free disposability of public inputs, we do not expect any particular sign for . If VZ
                                                 
10 In primal space, implies that the marginal product of an extra unit of the private fixed factor v is 
positive when the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output is positive; i.e.,  
0≥vZ
( )( ) ( ) 00** ≥∂∂⇔≥∂∂∂∂=∂∂−= vyvyyvZv AA ; where is the Lagrange function 
corresponding to equation (1) evaluated at the optimal x values,
*A( )y∂∂ *A  is the reciprocal marginal cost of 
an extra unit of output, and ( vy ∂∂ ) is the marginal product of the private fixed factor v. 
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 0≥VZ , an extra unit of the public factor generates short-run savings to agricultural 
producers; while if  it might actually increase short-run variable costs.0<VZ 11  
Local public goods are provided to satisfy the needs of a certain group of 
economic agents in a specific jurisdiction. In particular, local public knowledge on 
agricultural sciences generated for a specific state i, Gi, is developed to satisfy the needs 
of producers in that state. Therefore, it is completely usable by local producers and is 
incorporated as a public fixed input of production in the present model. However, that 
same knowledge might also be used by producers in other states after some adjustments 
to (different) local conditions. The stock of knowledge spill-outs from state i to state j 
(i j), S≠ ji, is the share of the stock of knowledge generated in state i, Gi, usable by 
producers in state j: 
(5)  ijiji GS α= ,  
where αji represents the degree of usability of knowledge from state i in state j, and 0≤ 
αji<1. Therefore, the aggregate stock of spill-ins from neighboring states (indexed by j) to 
state i is defined as: 
(6) , ∑∑
≠≠
==
ij
jij
ij
iji GSS α
and the vector of the stocks of public fixed inputs available to producers in state i is: 
(7) V’={Gi, Si}. 
The shadow value of the own state stock of public R&D in state i, ZGi, can now be 
expressed as: 
                                                 
11 Since the second order gradients of the variable cost with respect to private and public fixed inputs 
( , and )characterize the rate of change of their shadow values, and no assumption 
was made on the sign of their shadow values, no assumption is made on the rates of change. 
( )⋅∇ cvv ( )⋅∇ cvV ( )⋅∇ cVV
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 (8) , ( )iiGiGi SGvywcZ ,,,,−∇=
and the shadow value of the stock of public R&D from a neighboring state j, ZSij, as: 
(9) ( ) ( )iiSiijiiGjSij SGvywcSGvywcZ ,,,,,,,, ∇−=−∇= α , 
where the second equality holds by construction of the stock of knowledge spill-outs 
from state j to state i (equation 5).  These two concepts, obtained from the theoretical 
model, are used below in the calculation of the own state and the social IRR’s of public 
investments. 
The internal rate of return to public outlays in agricultural R&D is the discount 
rate that makes the discounted stream of benefits during m periods stemming from an 
increase in public investments in R&D in a given state i at time t0, equal to its initial cost. 
The initial cost is the extra investment in time t0, conventionally represented in discrete 
terms in the corporate finance literature as a negative amount, . In the present 
analysis, the stream of benefits for the state that conducted the R&D activities, state i, are 
the reductions in the cost of agricultural production in successive periods ( ) 
derived from the increased stock of publicly available knowledge ( ) generated by 
the investment in R&D in t
0
0, <Δ tiR
tic ,Δ−
tiG ,Δ
0. Therefore, the own state internal rate of return is the rate r 
that solves the following program: 
(10) ( )q
qti
m
q qti
qti
ti r
G
G
c
R +
Δ
Δ
Δ−Δ= +
= +
+∑ 10 0,1 0,
0,
0,
 
Note that 
titi
Gc
,,
ΔΔ− corresponds to the concept of ZGi, as defined in equation 
(8). Therefore, equation (10) can be re-expressed as: 
(11) ( )q
qti
m
q
qtGiti r
G
ZR +
Δ+Δ= +
=
+∑ 10 0,1 0,0,  
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 and a necessary condition for r to exist is that the shadow value of Gi be positive for at 
least one period, i.e., >0 for some q >0. However, as long as the knowledge 
generated by one state i is free and usable by producers in other j states, the concept of 
total benefits from an increase in public investments in R&D in state i at time t
qtGiZ +0,
0 might be 
expanded to also include the spillovers of that investment, i.e. the reductions in the cost 
of agricultural production in the other j states. The social internal rate of return is the rate 
r1 that solves the following program: 
(12) ( ) ( )∑∑∑ ≠
+
+
+
= +
++
= +
+
+
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ−+
Δ
Δ
Δ−Δ=
ij
q
qti
qti
qtj
m
q qtj
qtj
q
qti
m
q qti
qti
ti r
G
G
S
S
c
r
G
G
c
R
1
0,
0,
0,
1 0,
0,
1
0,
1 0,
0,
0, 11
0  
Note that 
tj
tj
S
c
,
,
Δ
Δ−
ti
tj
G
S
,
,
Δ
Δ
corresponds to the concept of the shadow value to state j of an 
increase in the stock of knowledge in state i, ZSji as defined in equation (9). Equation (12) 
can be re-expressed in terms of virtual prices as: 
(13) ( ) ( )∑∑∑ ≠
+
=
+
=
+
+ +
Δ++
Δ+Δ=
ij
q
qotk
m
q
qotSji
m
q
q
qoti
qotGiti r
G
Z
r
G
ZR
1
,
1
,
1 1
,
,0, 11
0  
The variable Gi is constructed as a weighted sum of previous expenditures in 
public agricultural R&D in state i ( ), with the weights following an inverted V-
pattern.
iR
12
(14)  ati
U
a
atti RG −
=
−∑= ,
1
, ϖ
Given that the αij’s are not observable, the variable Si is constructed as the direct 
sum of the stocks of Gj’s conducted in other states ( ij ≠ ):13
                                                 
12 A complete description on construction of Gi is given in the following section. 
13 A complete description of Si is given in the following section. 
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 (15)  ∑
≠
=
ij
tjti GS ,,
and the imperfect usability nature of knowledge generated in other states is incorporated 
structurally into the analysis through interaction terms in the variable cost chosen. The 
following translog cost function is hypothesized to be stable over the period 1949-1991: 
(16) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++
++
++=
∑∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑∑ ∑
==
= == =
= === =
KLMn
innS
GTyh
ihSi
GTyh GTyk
iihk
KLMn KLMm
iminnm
KLMn GTyh
iinnh
GTyh
ih
KLMn j
jinjni
whS
khww
hwhDUMwc
,,
,
,,
,, ,,,, ,,
,,
,, ,,
,
,,,,
48
1
,,
lnlnln
lnln
2
1lnln
2
1
lnlnlnlnln
ββ
ββ
βδδ
 
 where i indexes states (i =1, 2, …, 48 ). In this study, labor (L), purchased inputs (M), 
and capital (K) are treated as variable inputs, while land (T) is considered a private fixed 
input. Note that the stock of spill-ins is treated differently than the own-state stock of 
R&D: while G is fully usable by the state and is treated similarly to the private fixed 
factor T, S is only partially usable and enters the variable cost through interaction terms.  
In addition, since agricultural production is sensitive to the geoclimatic 
characteristics (soil type, humidity, etc.) of the area in which it is conducted, farms in 
different locations might use different technologies of production, this being another 
source of structural spatial heterogeneity across states (Anselin, 1988).  This translog 
function incorporates fixed state effects, represented by the dummy variables DUMj that 
capture, structurally, the unobservable characteristics of each state that influence local 
agricultural production. Note that these parameters are interacted with input prices in 
their levels to allow for fixed effects in the derived input demands.  In addition to the 
inclusion of terms in the specification of the cost function to capture structural 
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 differences and interactions across states, this study allows stochastic spatial interaction 
with the purpose of using information that might not be captured structurally. 
For each state i, the three private input share equations (n=M, K, L), the virtual 
share of the private fixed input T, and the virtual shares of the public fixed inputs G and S 
implied by (16) are derived using Shephard’s lemma, respectively, as (i subscripts 
omitted for simplicity of exposition): 
(17) hwDUM
w
c
c
nwSH
SGTyh
nh
KLMm
mnm
j
jjn
n
n
n lnlnln
ln
,,,,,
, ∑∑∑
==
++=∂
∂== ββδ   
(18) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++−==∂
∂−= ∑∑
==
Shw
c
TZ
T
c
TS
GTyh
hT
MKLn
nnTT
T
Tc lnlnlnln
ln
,,,,
, βββδε  
(19) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++−==∂
∂−= ∑∑
==
Shw
c
GZ
G
c
GS
GTyh
hG
MKLn
nnGG
G
Gc lnlnlnln
ln
,,,,
, βββδε  
(20) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−==∂
∂−= ∑∑
== GTyh
hS
MKLn
nnS
S
Sc hwc
SZ
S
c
,,,,
, lnlnln
ln ββε  
Equations (18), (19) and (20) are, respectively, the elasticity of cost with respect to land, 
the elasticity of cost with respect to the own state stock of public agricultural R&D, and 
the elasticity of cost with respect to the stock of spill-ins from public agricultural R&D 
conducted in neighboring states. These elasticities can be either positive or negative, 
depending on the free disposability of the fixed inputs and their levels with respect to 
their long-run optimum. 
In order to estimate the own state IRR to public expenditures in agricultural R&D, 
expression (11) can be conveniently expressed as the discounted sum of the shadow 
values of Gi over time weighted by the research expenditure weights used to construct the 
stocks of public agricultural R&D from equation (14)  
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 (21) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑ =
+
=
+++
=
+ ++=++=+Δ
Δ+=
m
q
q
qti
m
q
q
qtGiqt
q
ti
qti
m
q
qtGi r
B
r
Z
rR
G
Z
1
0,
1
0,0
0,
0,
1
0, 1
1
1
1
1
110
ϖ
 
where tGitti ZB ,, ϖ=  is a direct measure of the own state monetary benefits at t from an 
extra dollar invested in public agricultural R&D at t0. We use equation (19) with 00 =tϖ  
to evaluate equation (21) and obtain the own state IRR to investment in public 
agricultural R&D in each of the 48 states.  
Similarly, using equations (13), (14) and (15), the social IRR r1 can be expressed 
as: 
(22) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∑∑
∑
∑
∑∑∑
=
∗
+
=
++
=
≠
+++
≠ =
++
=
++
+=+=
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
=+++=−
m
q
q
qti
m
q
q
qtiqt
m
q
q
ij
qtSijqtGiqt
ij
m
q
q
qtSijqt
m
q
q
qtGiqt
r
B
r
F
r
ZZ
r
Z
r
Z
0 1
0,
0 1
0,0
0 1
0,0,0
0 1
0,0
0 1
0,0
11
111
1
ϖ
ϖϖϖ
 
where  is the social shadow value of GtiF , i at time t; and  measures social 
monetary benefits at time t from an extra dollar invested in public agricultural R&D in 
state i at t
titti FB ,
*
, ϖ=
0. We use equations (19) and (20) to estimate r1.  
If ZSi  ≥ 0 then r1 ≥ r, indicating that the total benefits of R&D are at least as big as 
the benefits that accrue only to the state where the expenses were incurred. 
 
3. Data 
The agricultural production variables for all 48 states for the period 1949-1991 are 
from Craig, Pardey and Acquaye (2002)14. According to Acquaye, Alston and Pardey 
                                                 
14 This data set was available at http://www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/ppardey/data.html, but it is no longer on 
line. It is the data set used in Acquaye, Alston and Pardey (2003). This data set has been revised and 
extended over 1949-2002 (Pardey, Andersen and Craig, 2007), but is not publicly available. Comparing the 
 14
 (2003) this data set “was developed with a view in particular to measuring the effects of 
public agricultural R&D on productivity” and it included Fisher Ideal quantity indexes 
for agricultural output, labor, purchased inputs, capital and land, expenditures in land, 
labor, purchased inputs and capital, and the value of total agricultural output for each 
state (see Appendix 1). The variable cost in this study is the sum of expenditures in labor, 
purchased inputs and capital for farm production in constant 1949 dollars.15 In order to 
reflect the differences in the relative sizes of the agricultural sector across states, we 
multiplied quantity indexes for land and output by their respective expenditures in 
1949.16
The own-state R&D stock G was constructed as a 31-year weighted average of 
gross public expenditures in agricultural R&D at state level in constant U.S. dollars, 
according to (14).17 As in McCunn and Huffman (2000), the reason for using political 
                                                                                                                                                 
descriptive statistics of the newer series from Table 1 in Andersen, Alston and Pardey (2007) to the older 
series, capital seems to have been revised downwards (the mean, the minimum and the maximum values 
are about 5% lower in the newer data set than in the older one, while the standard deviation is only 1.5% 
higher). The output series also seems to have suffered significant revision: the minimum value is 24% 
lower and the standard deviation is 19% higher in the newer data set, while the mean is only 1.6% higher. 
We did not use the1960-1993 data set from O'Donnel, Shumway and Ball (1999) because it was revised 
and modified after 1993. Alternatively we could have used the data developed by ERS (1998) to obtain 
indexes of productivity by state for 1960-1996 or the revised version used in Ball, Butault and Nehring 
(2001). But the state-level expenditures in agricultural inputs used in the construction of their quantity 
indexes and needed for our estimation were not available to us. 
15 We obtained the series of expenditures in purchased inputs, capital and labor in constant 1949 dollars by 
multiplying the Fisher Ideal input quantity indexes (1949=100) by the expenditures in each input in 1949. 
According to Acquaye, Alston and Pardey (2003), data for labor comprise 30 farm operator classes (five 
age and six education characteristics), family labor, and hired labor. Data for purchased inputs involve 
pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, seed, feed, repairs, machine hire, and miscellaneous expenses. Capital involves 
buildings and structures, automobiles (units not for personal use), trucks, pickers and balers, mowers and 
conditioners, tractors, combines, dairy cattle, breeder pigs, sheep and cows, and chickens (not broilers) 
16 Land comprises cropland, irrigated cropland and grassland, pasture, range and grazed forest. Agricultural 
output aggregates field crops, fruits and nuts, vegetables and livestock 
17 Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1989, 1992, 1993, 2001), and Khanna, Huffman and Sandler 
(1994) have constructed and used R&D stocks for U.S. states but these data sets have not been made 
public. We proceed to build our own for the purpose of this study. The mean of G in our study closely 
resembles the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital for an originating 
state”:  $1.73 million in 1949 dollars or $10.1 million in 1986 dollars. The mean of S in our study is lower 
than the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital spillin”: $7.65 million vs. 
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 rather than geoclimatic borders is our focus on public funding, which is based on political 
borders. The weights tϖ are constructed by transforming Chavas and Cox’s (1992) 
estimated marginal effects of public research expenditures on U.S. agricultural 
productivity, , to add up to one: tCC
(23) 
∑
=
+
+
+ = 31
1
0
0
0
i
it
it
it
CC
CCϖ  
The weights follow an inverted-V distribution of the lags of the effects of R&D 
on productivity through time implying a gestation period of seven years, followed by an 
eight year period of increasing effects at a low rate, and another eight year period of 
increasing effects at a higher rate, reaching a maximum in year twenty three, and 
declining to zero from there onwards by year thirty one.18 These estimates are appealing 
because they were obtained using non-parametric methods, avoiding strong distributional 
assumptions required in parametric estimation.19 Gross public expenditures include all 
USDA appropriations, CSREES administered funds, state appropriations, and other 
federal and non-federal funds for State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) and 
1890 Institutions.20 Data on total public agricultural R&D expenditures at the state level 
                                                                                                                                                 
$8.86 million in 1949 dollars, or $44.7 million vs. $51.8 million in 1986 dollars. We were unable to 
compare the distribution of our variables to theirs. This is true for variables G and S in our study.  
18 Different studies adopt different weight structures: inverted-V form (Evenson 1967), second order 
polynomial (Knutson and Tweeten) or trapezoidal (Huffman and Evenson 1989). 
19 We realize that the marginal effects of public agricultural research expenditure on agricultural 
productivity might be endogenous to each state and are likely to differ among states. But given that no 
publicly available study estimates the marginal effects for each state, we use a set of estimated marginal 
effects at the national aggregate to compute the R&D stocks. While some early studies used 10- or 20-year 
lags (Evenson 1967, Knutson and Tweeten, White and Havlicek), more recent studies suggest that in order 
to properly capture the benefits of investment in research on agricultural production, lags of at least 30 
years must be used in the construction of the stocks (Pardey and Craig (1989), Schimmelpfennig and 
Thirtle (1994), Alston, Craig and Pardey (1998), Alston and Pardey (2001)).  
20 USDA appropriations for the Forest Service, the Mc Intire-Stennis Act from the CSREES Administered 
Funds, and all funds for Forestry Schools are excluded. 
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 in current U.S. dollars were obtained from the Current Research Information System 
Database (CRIS) for the period 1970-1991. Given the long lags assumed to construct the 
stock, data is needed for earlier periods and for the years 1919-1969, we have data only 
for agricultural R&D expenditures at SAES.  These were collected, in current dollars, 
from several USDA reports.  These series were used to construct a proxy for total 
agricultural R&D expenditures at the state level for the years 1919-1969 using the 
average ratio of total to SAES agricultural R&D expenditures in 1970-1980 and 
extrapolating to 1919.21  An agricultural R&D price index was constructed for the period 
1919-1999 from Huffman and Evenson (1993) and USDA data, which was used to 
express the expenditure series in constant 1949 dollars. 22
The spill-in variable S is constructed as the sum of the stocks of public 
agricultural R&D of the states that share common borders or vertices with the state under 
analysis, indexed by j and i, respectively, in equation (6). The geographical proximity 
criteria to construct spillover variables has previously been used by Khanna, Huffman 
and Sandler (1994), Huffman et al (2002), and Yee et al (2002) to reflect similarities in 
climatic conditions, production conditions, input-output mixes, etc., among the states 
under analysis.23 In the present study, S captures the effects of structural spill-ins from 
                                                 
21 A similar methodology has been applied by Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) and Yee et.al. (2002). 
22 The concept of deflated total public agricultural R&D expenditures in this study resembles that of total 
public expenditures on agricultural research used by Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994). The main 
difference is that forestry funds are excluded from the present study. We have not been able to do a 
numerical comparison as their data is not publicly available. 
23 Alston (2002) reports that a paper in press by Alston, James, Pardey and Zhang uses a different measure 
of similarity, based on technological proximity across states according to their output mixes rather than 
geographical proximity, and that significant inter-state spillover effects are found. However, the paper in 
press by Alston et al is not publicly available yet. We experimented using the uncentered output-mix 
correlation coefficient among states to construct the state-state stock of structural spillovers based on the 
agricultural technological similarity across states in the spirit of Alston et al (in press), and the value of the 
resulting structural spillover stocks were very similar to the values of the structural spillovers obtained 
based on geographical proximity. We also tried to find a pattern of technological similarity across states by 
applying cluster analysis techniques to the states’ agricultural output-mix, and the results were highly 
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 R&D conducted in neighboring states. For example, S for Nebraska consists of the sum 
of the stocks of R&D in Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado. 
See Appendix 1 for the descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis. 
 
4. Estimation and Results 
This section is organized as follows. Two versions of the model consisting of the 
cost function and the capital and purchased inputs shares, equations (16) and (17), are 
estimated maintaining symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices. Model 1 assumes that 
the spill-in variable S captures all relevant knowledge spillovers across states, i.e. it 
models structural spatial dependency. To test for the existence of stochastic effects of 
knowledge spillovers beyond the structural effects captured by S, a modified version of 
the Keleijian and Robinson (1992) test is performed on the residuals of Model 1. This test 
provides an assessment of the extent of the propagation of spillovers not captured by the 
variable S, and of the impact of any event that affects adjacent states and is not captured 
in the structure of the model. It indicates the necessity to acknowledge and model 
stochastic spatial dependency. Model 2 is estimated using three-stage generalized spatial 
least squares (3SGSLS) to correct for the stochastic effects. Results from Model 2 are 
then compared to those from Model 1 to assess the effect of failing to account for 
stochastic dependency among states. The best model is selected on the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
dependent on the method used (single linkage, average linkage or centroid) and the criteria used to define 
the optimal number of clusters (hierarchical tree diagram, pseudo F statistic or pseudo Hotteling’s T2 test 
statistic) 
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 McElroy System R-square24 and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each 
equation.  
The variable cost and the purchased inputs and capital shares in Model 1 are 
estimated using iterative seemingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR in version SAS 9.1). 
The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity of the 
estimation matrix and its parameters recovered using the set of restrictions imposed. One 
hundred and seventy four parameters are estimated with 6192 observations (three stacked 
equations and 43 years for each of the 48 states.)  The model fits the data reasonably 
well, with a system R2 of 0.896 and adjusted R2 for each estimating equation greater than 
0.8. These parameters conform to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have 
been imposed in estimation.  The Hessian is negative semi-definite at the mean of the 
data for each state implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the data.   The 
cost function is non-decreasing in output as the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of 
the data is positive for all states. Parameter estimates are reported in Appendix 2.  
Given that our main objective is the estimation of returns to local public inputs 
and the calculation of the implied IRR for public R&D investments we focus on these 
estimates. The effects of public inputs on the demand for private variable inputs is 
computed from equations (19) and (20).25 The effects of G and S on purchased inputs and 
labor are statistically significant for all states, but their effects on capital are not. An 
increase in G or in S generates an increase in the demand for purchased inputs and a 
decrease in the demand for labor, suggesting that technical change induced by public 
                                                 
24 The McElroy System R-square is a weighted average of the R-square for each equation in the system, 
and is bounded to the 0-1 interval (Greene 2003, p.345). 
25 Estimates indicate that, at the mean, land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a 
complement for labor in all states. 
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 agricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of purchased inputs and against the use 
of labor in all states.26
The most important estimates for our purpose are the estimates of the shadow 
prices for public inputs G and S as they enter directly the calculation of the IRRs. The 
shadow price of the own state stock of public agricultural R&D as defined in equations 
(4) and (19) is evaluated at the sample mean of all variables and for each state and it is 
reported in the second column of Table 1. GZ measures the amount of cost savings in the 
production of output at constant 1949 dollars stemming from the public provision of an 
extra unit of G. Alternatively, GZ measures producers’ willingness to pay for an extra 
unit of stock of public local agricultural R&D. For example, the shadow value of G for 
Nebraska is, at the mean, $414.69, indicating that a $1 increase in the stock of public 
agricultural R&D in Nebraska in a given year generated annual cost savings to 
agricultural producers of, on average, $414.69. The estimates of GZ are statistically 
significant and positive for all states but California, Maine, and Maryland. As shown 
below, the fact that GZ  is not statistically different from zero for California, Maine, and 
Maryland is driven by the inability of Model 1 to incorporate the effects of stochastic 
spatial dependency, resulting in estimates with wide confidence intervals.27  
Note, however, that in the present study a $1 increase in the stock of public 
agricultural R&D in a given year requires a $1 investment in public agricultural R&D 
                                                 
26 Price elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data for each state indicate that own-price elasticities are 
negative, as expected. Cross-price elasticities for all inputs evaluated at the mean are positive, indicating 
that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes in production. Marginal cost elasticities evaluated 
at the mean of the data show 26 states with increasing returns to scale and 22 states with decreasing returns 
to scale. 
 
27 The coefficients of variation are 107%, 242% and 51% for California, Maine and Maryland respectively. 
Coefficient of variation= standard error /|mean| 
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 activities during the previous 31 years. Therefore, the own state annual average monetary 
benefit from investing an extra dollar in public agricultural R&D in t0, is 
(24)  31
31
1
0∑= += i itBB ,  
where B refers to own state benefits as defined in equation (21), and is a more intuitive 
measure of the benefits from R&D investments in agriculture (second column of Table 
1). The 31-year annual average benefits vary from $0.63 for New York to $23.28 for 
Missouri for every $1 invested (constant 1949 dollars), and the national simple average 
amounts to $7.63 with a standard deviation among states of $5.43. The national weighted 
average of the own state benefits, with the weights being each state’s average share in 
total output, amounts to $8.22 and is significant at the 1% level. It must be emphasized, 
however, that given the distribution assumed in constructing the research stock variable, 
the impacts are assumed to be higher in the distant future than in the years immediately 
following the investment. 
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 Table 1. Own state and social shadow values (Z, F) and benefits (B, B*) from 
agricultural R&D, no stochastic spatial dependency (Model 1, constant 1949 dollars) 
STATE GZ  B  F  *B  
AL 226.42 (9.11) 7.30 (0.082) 759.57 (18.76) 24.5 (0.170) 
AR 608.53 (27.48) 19.63 (0.249) 1987.12 (49.99) 64.1 (0.452) 
AZ 126.93 (5.08) 4.09 (0.046) 1021.54 (33.09) 32.95 (0.299) 
CA -15.9 (16.95) n/a 367.04 (19.40) 11.84 (0.176) 
CO 214.5 (9.86) 6.92 (0.089) 1747.31 (58.14) 56.36 (0.526) 
CT 66.2 (4.77) 2.14 (0.043) 239.98 (11.49) 7.74 (0.104) 
DE 193.1 (15.39) 6.23 (0.139) 386.26 (19.19) 12.46 (0.174) 
FL 27.7 (6.81) 0.89 (0.062) 280.25 (13.14) 9.04 (0.119) 
GA 173.03 (10.51) 5.58 (0.095) 882.39 (28.29) 28.46 (0.256) 
IA 430.66 (28.19) 13.89 (0.255) 1903.17 (64.29) 61.39 (0.582) 
ID 275.95 (12.16) 8.90 (0.110) 1204.72 (34.82) 38.86 (0.315) 
IL 171.61 (13.23) 5.54 (0.120) 1815.68 (59.57) 58.57 (0.539) 
IN 275.7 (13.57) 8.89 (0.123) 1179.57 (30.00) 38.05 (0.271) 
KS 410.22 (23.86) 13.23 (0.216) 1434.58 (44.22) 46.28 (0.400) 
KY 311.79 (14.78) 10.06 (0.134) 1906.61 (53.69) 61.5 (0.486) 
LA 51.7 (5.42) 1.67 (0.049) 809.63 (24.97) 26.12 (0.226) 
MA 118.5 (7.4) 3.82 (0.067) 315.37 (19.41) 10.17 (0.176) 
MD -5.14 (2.64) n/a 374.39 (25.13) 12.08 (0.227) 
ME -9.82 (23.74) n/a -29.03 (25.41) n/a 
MI 298.21 (12.5) 9.62 (0.113) 1552.31 (42.67) 50.07 (0.386) 
MN 359.97 (23.12) 11.61 (0.209) 1525.61 (51.36) 49.21 (0.465) 
MO 675.1 (32.11) 21.78 (0.291) 2792.67 (83.15) 90.09 (0.752) 
MS 96.96 (7.5) 3.13 (0.068) 793.26 (24.36) 25.59 (0.220) 
MT 148.62 (9.38) 4.79 (0.085) 891.18 (35.1) 28.75 (0.318) 
NC 266.31 (16.07) 8.59 (0.145) 834.11 (27.11) 26.91 (0.245) 
ND 128.96 (8.36) 4.16 (0.076) 811.07 (35.2) 26.16 (0.318) 
NE 414.69 (22.71) 13.38 (0.205) 2112.61 (79.8) 68.15 (0.722) 
NH 105.79 (16.04) 3.41 (0.145) 255.01 (21.51) 8.23 (0.195) 
NJ 65.93 (4.68) 2.13 (0.042) 296.8 (15.91) 9.57 (0.144) 
NM 302.95 (14.2) 9.77 (0.128) 1447.21 (38.23) 46.68 (0.346) 
NV 172.85 (12.68) 5.58 (0.115) 1076.17 (32.54) 34.72 (0.294) 
NY 19.4 (6.97) 0.63 (0.063) 369.16 (26.59) 11.91 (0.241) 
OH 241.41 (11.88) 7.79 (0.107) 1196.53 (32.36) 38.60 (0.293) 
OK 249.73 (9.25) 8.06 (0.084) 1846.47 (66) 59.56 (0.597) 
OR 130.88 (12.61) 4.22 (0.114) 859.55 (25.62) 27.73 (0.232) 
PA 214.87 (11.47) 6.93 (0.104) 642.32 (25.75) 20.72 (0.233) 
RI 32.83 (4.48) 1.06 (0.041) 117.54 (7.34) 3.79 (0.066) 
SC 92.81 (7.99) 2.99 (0.072) 385.78 (15.08) 12.44 (0.136) 
SD 721.77 (36.73) 23.28 (0.332) 2275.57 (63.4) 73.41 (0.574) 
TN 510.12 (21.14) 16.46 (0.191) 1936.01 (48.88) 62.45 (0.442) 
TX 113.32 (20.09) 3.66 (0.182) 764.04 (28.48) 24.65 (0.258) 
UT 116.51 (12.18) 3.76 (0.110) 1021.92 (35.42) 32.97 (0.320) 
VA 343.09 (13.28) 11.07 (0.120) 938.1 (22.95) 30.26 (0.208) 
VT 421.46 (24.33) 13.60 (0.220) 564.29 (25.78) 18.20 (0.233) 
WA 44.95 (11.28) 1.45 (0.102) 408.34 (15.15) 13.17 (0.137) 
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 WI 290.79 (13.65) 9.38 (0.123) 1301.38 (35.79) 41.98 (0.324) 
WV 210.93 (11.10) 6.80 (0.100) 829.04 (24.83) 26.74 (0.225) 
WY 171.29 (12.15) 5.53 (0.110) 1501.56 (56.36) 48.44 (0.510) 
Simple National Average 221.13 7.63 1,040.25 34.29 
Simple National Std.Dev 173.72 5.43 656.54 20.78 
Weighted Nat’l. Average 254.73 (16.85) 8.22 (0.15) 1253.72 (41.10) 40.44 (0.37) 
Approximated standard errors in parentheses.28 n/a: Not available 
 
The average social shadow value of G,  
(25) 31
31
1
0∑= += i itFF  
where F is the social shadow value of research stocks defined in equation (22), and the 
average social monetary benefits from an extra dollar invested in agricultural R&D in t0, 
(26)  31
31
1
*
0
* ∑
=
+=
i
itBB ,  
where B* refers to social benefits as defined in equation (22), are reported for each state 
in the last two columns of Table 1. Except for Maine, all estimates of F  are positive and 
significantly different from zero. As expected, F  is greater than GZ , implying a positive 
shadow value for research spillovers, ∑
≠ij
SjiZ . The implied annual averages of the social 
benefits from R&D, in 1949 dollars, range from $3.79 (Rhode Island) to $90.09 
(Missouri). The national simple average is $34.29 with a standard deviation across states 
of $20.78. The national weighted average of the social benefits, with the weights being 
each state’s average shares in total output, amounts to $40.44 and is significant at the 1% 
level. 
The estimated average marginal IRR from own state investment in public 
agricultural R&D, 
∧
r , is obtained by plugging the estimate of GZ  from Table 1 into 
                                                 
28 Approximated standard errors obtained by the Delta method (Greene 2003).  
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 equation (21) and solving for r.  Similarly, the estimated average marginal IRR from 
social investments in public agricultural R&D, , is obtained by plugging the estimate 
of
1
∧
r
F from Table 1 into equation (22) and solving for r1. Ninety five percent confidence 
intervals for 
∧
r  and  for each state are obtained by plugging the corresponding shadow 
values plus/minus two standard errors in equations 
1
∧
r
(21) and (22), respectively (Table 2 
and Figures 1 and 2). The simple average own state IRR for the nation is 26.9%, with a 
standard deviation of 8.91% across states. The weighted average own state IRR for the 
nation is 27.4%, and the 95% confidence interval is [26.2%; 29.5%]. The highest own 
state IRR is 39% and corresponds to South Dakota. The simple average social IRR for 
the nation is 40%, with a standard deviation of 8.38%. The weighted average social IRR 
for the nation is 42.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is [41.7%; 43.0%]. The highest 
social IRR is 51% and corresponds to Missouri. In all states but Maine the social IRR is 
significantly higher than the own state IRR, as indicated by the non-overlapping 
confidence intervals reported below the IRR estimates in Table 2. 
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 Table 2. Own state (r) and social (r1 ) IRRs (in percentage), no stochastic spatial 
effects (Model 1), 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.  
State ∧r  1
∧
r  State 
∧
r  1
∧
r  State 
∧
r  1
∧
r  
AL 30.08 [29.5;30.6] 
39.41 
[39.0;39.8] MD 
n/a        
[n/a,n/a] 
33.78 
[32.7;34.7] OR 
26.29 
[24.9;27.5] 
40.45 
[39.9;40.9] 
AR 37.58 [36.8;38.3] 
48.05 
[47.6;48.5] ME 
n/a 
[n/a;18.5] 
n/a 
[n/a;15.3] PA 
29.7 
[28.9;30.4] 
38.02 
[37.3;38.7] 
AZ 26.08 [25.5;26.6] 
41.94 
[41.4;42.5] MI 
32.07 
[31.4;32.7] 
45.71 
[45.2;46.2] RI 
17.65 
[15.8;19.1] 
25.57 
[24.7;26.4] 
CA n/a [n/a;14.2] 
33.63 
[32.8;34.4] MN 
33.48 
[32.4;34.4] 
45.54 
[44.9;46.2] SC 
24.03 
[22.8;25.1] 
34 
[33.4;34.6] 
CO 29.69 [29.0;30.3] 
46.82 
[46.2;47.4] MO 
38.43 
[37.6;39.2] 
51.43 
[50.8;52.0] SD 
38.98 
[38.1;39.8] 
49.37 
[48.8;49.9] 
CT 21.88 [20.9;22.7] 
30.49 
[29.8;31.2] MS 
24.31 
[23.2;25.2] 
39.77 
[39.2;40.3] TN 
36.17 
[35.5;36.8] 
47.8 
[47.3;48.3] 
DE 28.95 [27.7;30.0] 
34.01 
[33.2;34.7] MT 
27.14 
[26.2;28.0] 
40.76 
[40.1;41.4] TX 
25.33 
[22.5;27.4] 
39.46 
[38.8;40.1] 
FL 16.67 [12.9;19.0] 
31.62 
[30.9;32.3] NC 
31.25 
[30.3;32.1] 
40.2 
[39.6;40.7] UT 
25.51 
[24.0;26.8] 
41.94 
[41.3;42.5] 
GA 28.19 [27.3;29.0] 
40.67 
[40.1;41.2] ND 
26.19 
[25.3;27.0] 
39.96 
[39.2;40.7] VA 
33.12 
[32.5;33.7] 
41.2 
[40.8;41.6] 
IA 34.85 [33.8;35.8] 
47.63 
[47.0;48.3] NE 
34.56 
[33.7;35.4] 
48.64 
[47.9;49.4] VT 
34.68 
[33.7;35.5] 
36.98 
[36.2;37.7] 
ID 31.5 [30.8;32.1] 
43.39 
[42.9;43.9] NH 
24.88 
[22.6;26.6] 
30.93 
[29.6;32.1] WA 
19.51 
[15.5;22.0] 
34.44 
[33.9;35] 
IL 28.13 [27.0;29.1] 
47.18 
[46.5;47.8] NJ 
21.86 
[20.9;22.7] 
32.04 
[31.2;32.8] WI 
31.89 
[31.2;32.6] 
44.09 
[43.6;44.6] 
IN 31.5 [30.7;32.2] 
43.21 
[42.7;43.6] NM 
32.19 
[31.5;32.9] 
45.06 
[44.6;45.5] WV 
29.57 
[28.8;30.3] 
40.14 
[39.6;40.6] 
KS 34.47 [33.5;35.3] 
44.98 
[44.4;45.5] NV 
28.18 
[27.1;29.1] 
42.39 
[41.8;42.9] WY 
28.12 
[27.1;29.0] 
45.4 
[44.7;46.1] 
KY 32.4 [31.7;33.1] 
47.65 
[47.1;48.2] NY 
14.66 
[8.0;17.7] 
33.67 
[32.5;34.7] SNA* 
28.65 
[25.7;28.5] 
39.84 
[39.2;40.8] 
LA 20.36 [18.9;21.5] 
39.94 
[39.4;40.5] OH 
30.54 
[29.8;31.2] 
43.33 
[42.8;43.8] 
MA 25.62 [24.7;26.4] 
32.49 
[31.5;33.4] OK 
30.78 
[30.2;31.3] 
47.34 
[46.6;48.0] 
WNA.* 27.37 [26.2;29.5] 
42.33 
[41.7;43.0] 
Note: n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative. SNA: Simple 
National Average. WNA: Weighted National Average*The bounds of the confidence interval for the 
National Average are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states. 
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 Figure 1. Histogram of the own state IRR’s, (
∧
r ) – Model 1 
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Figure 2. Histogram of the social IRR’s, ( )  – Model 1 1
∧
r
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 A modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson (KR) test for spatial 
autocorrelation in systems of equations, from Cohen and Morrison Paul is used on the 
errors of Model 1 to test for stochastic spatial dependence across states.  The KR test 
provides an estimate of the number of significant spatial lags in each equation. It is a 
large sample test based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and it does not 
require the model to be linear, the disturbance terms to be normal, or the pattern of spatial 
correlation to be specified. The KR test requires an a priori choice of the neighboring 
states that might be spatially correlated, but it does not require knowledge of the spatial 
weights. A geographical pattern of proximity among states is proposed as the driving 
force for spatial autocorrelation in the error structure. For each state, the U.S. map is 
divided in concentric “rings” with the state under analysis as its center, the states that 
share a common border or intercept with the center as the first “ring” of neighboring 
states; the states that are detached from the center but share common borders or intercepts 
with the first “ring” as the second “ring” of neighboring states; and so on and so forth.29 
In this geographical partitioning of the space, states are expected to be more closely 
related to immediate neighboring states than those farther away. The results from the KR 
test suggest that there exists stochastic spatial dependency among states that are as much 
as four states apart from one another.  This would be consistent with knowledge 
spillovers flowing widely across states and generating the spatial lag structures. 30   The 
                                                 
29 For example, Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado belong to the first “ring” of 
neighboring states for Nebraska; while New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma form its second “ring” of 
neighboring states; Texas, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, West 
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia form its third “ring” of 
neighboring states. 
30 We cannot discard the possibility of other variables not included in the model structure, like weather for 
example, adding to this dependency. In any case IRRs should be corrected if spatial dependency is present 
no matter what the source. 
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 variable cost function, , and the capital share, , support a spatial lag length of 5, 
while the share of purchased inputs, , has a spatial lag of length 4. 
cln KSH
MSH
To incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial dependency in the estimation of 
the benefits from public agricultural R&D, Model 2 is estimated using the GS3SLS 
procedure proposed by Keleijian and Prucha (2004). The first stage corresponds to the 
estimation of Model 1. In the second stage, the residuals from Model 1 and the lag 
structure suggested by the KR test are used to estimate the spatial autocorrelation 
parameters for each estimating equation using GMM. The estimates of the spatial 
autocorrelation parameters (Table 3), which are all bounded to the unit circle, are used to 
perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-type transformation on the observed variables, in a similar 
fashion to the standard procedure to correct for serial autocorrelation in time series. In the 
third stage, Model 2 determined by equations (16) and (17) is re-estimated on the 
transformed variables with symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices maintained. 
Table 3. Estimates of the spatial autocorrelation parameters. 31
Equation 1ρ  2ρ  3ρ  4ρ  5ρ  
cln  0.265554 0.493288 0.196007 -0.37656 0.180117 
KSH  0.634002 -0.14269 0.22608 0.063719 0.010952 
MSH  0.587572 -0.05815 0.353718 -0.19113  
 
The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity as in 
estimation of Model 1. One hundred and seventy four parameters are estimated with 6192 
observations (three stacked equations and 43 years for each of the 48 states) in Model 2.  
The system R-square for Model 2 (R2=0.911) is higher than the one from Model 1, and 
the AICs are lower for each estimating equation. Model 2 provides a better fit to the 
                                                 
31 Standard errors for estimates in Table 3 are not reported because the significance of the spatial effects has 
been determined through the KR test, as a previous step to the estimation of the ρ’s using GMM. 
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 transformed data than Model 1 does to the untransformed data. The estimated parameters 
conform to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have been imposed in the 
estimation.  The Hessian is negative semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state 
implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the data.  The cost function is non-
decreasing in output as the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is positive for 
all states. 32 The estimates from Model 2 and the associated goodness of fit measures are 
reported in Appendix 3.  
The effects of G and S on the demand for variable inputs (measured as the 
elasticities of demand with respect to the fixed public inputs) are all significant in Model 
2. An increase in G or S generates an increase in the demand for purchased inputs and 
capital, and a decrease in the demand for labor, suggesting that technical change induced 
by public agricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of purchased inputs and 
capital and against labor. 33,34
The own state shadow value of G, GZ , and the own state monetary benefits from 
an extra dollar invested in R&D in t0, B , are evaluated at the mean and reported for each 
state in the first two columns of Table 4. The estimates of GZ are statistically significant 
and positive for all states.35 B ranges from $0.05 in Oregon to $2.63 in Maine and the 
simple national average is $0.94, while the weighted national average is $1.02 and is 
                                                 
32 The marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the variables indicate increasing returns to scale 
for all states, satisfying one of the necessary conditions for endogenous growth (Onofri and Fulginiti). A 
second condition, namely that of non-negative returns to public inputs, is also satisfied as the estimates of 
the shadows for public R&D in Table 4 show. 
33 Land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement of labor. 
34 For all states, the own-price elasticities are negative, as expected, and the cross-price elasticities for all 
inputs are positive, indicating that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes. 
35 The coefficients of variation for California, and Maine are now significantly lower than in Model 1 
(55%, 18%, respectively), while the coefficient of variation for Maryland is higher (77%). 
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 statistically significant at the 1% level (constant 1949 dollars). The estimates of own state 
benefits are now significantly lower than the own state benefits obtained in Model 1. 
The social shadow value of public agricultural R&D, F , and the social monetary 
benefits from an extra dollar invested in R&D in t0, *B , are evaluated at the mean and 
reported for each state in the last two columns of Table 4. All social shadows are non-
negative and significantly different from zero. Social shadows are higher than own state 
shadow values for public agricultural R&D stocks (estimates of F  are greater than GZ ), 
implying a positive shadow value for spillouts, ∑
≠ij
SjiZ . Social benefits,
*B , range from 
$0.33 in Rhode Island to $18.46 in Missouri, with a simple national average of $6.39 
(constant 1949 dollars) and a weighted national average of $7.98, significant at the 1% 
level. As mentioned before, benefits from the investments have a higher impact in the 
distant future than in the years immediately following the investment in R&D.   
Table 4. Own state and social shadow values ( GZ , F ) and benefits ( B ,
*B ) from 
agricultural R&D, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2, constant 1949 dollars) 
STATE GZ  B  F  *B  
AL 34.9 (5.78) 1.13 (0.052) 123.7 (15.79) 3.99 (0.143) 
AR 51 (17.07) 1.65 (0.154) 317.0 (40.70) 10.23 (0.368) 
AZ 11.6 (3.16) 0.38 (0.029) 198.4 (24.39) 6.4 (0.221) 
CA 17.1 (9.41) 0.55 (0.085) 94.4 (12.34) 3.04 (0.112) 
CO 21.1 (6.40) 0.68 (0.058) 385.9 (43.37) 12.45 (0.392) 
CT 14.4 (2.63) 0.47 (0.024) 12.9 (8.41) 0.42 (0.076) 
DE 33.2 (8.90) 1.07 (0.081) 29.9 (12.86) 0.97 (0.116) 
FL 22 (3.64) 0.71 (0.033) 64.8 (8.56) 2.09 (0.077) 
GA 31.5 (6.39) 1.02 (0.058) 159.1 (21.18) 5.13 (0.192) 
IA 37.1 (18.19) 1.2 (0.165) 390.4 (46.32) 12.59 (0.419) 
ID 31.7 (7.51) 1.02 (0.068) 226.3 (26.90) 7.3 (0.243) 
IL 12.3 (8.61) 0.4 (0.078) 358.3 (44.04) 11.56 (0.398) 
IN 29.4 (9.13) 0.95 (0.083) 183.1 (24.95) 5.91 (0.226) 
KS 62.3 (14.88) 2.01 (0.135) 313.0 (33.41) 10.1 (0.302) 
KY 14.3 (9.72) 0.46 (0.088) 350.9 (42.92) 11.32 (0.388) 
LA 5.5 (3.25) 0.18 (0.029) 157.3 (19.09) 5.07 (0.173) 
MA 22.4 (4.13) 0.72 (0.037) 21.6 (13.30) 0.7 (0.12) 
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 MD 1.9 (1.42) 0.06 (0.013) 55.0 (15.76) 1.78 (0.143) 
ME 81.4 (14.80) 2.63 (0.134) 72.0 (15.52) 2.32 (0.14) 
MI 30 (8.27) 0.97 (0.075) 243.9 (34.21) 7.87 (0.31) 
MN 52.2 (14.40) 1.68 (0.13) 313.7 (36.78) 10.12 (0.333) 
MO 51.7 (20.58) 1.67 (0.186) 572.3 (63.53) 18.46 (0.575) 
MS 17.6 (4.60) 0.57 (0.042) 174.3 (18.59) 5.62 (0.168) 
MT 30 (5.88) 0.97 (0.053) 231.6 (25.33) 7.47 (0.229) 
NC 55.5 (9.75) 1.79 (0.088) 175.1 (19.58) 5.65 (0.177) 
ND 30.3 (5.19) 0.98 (0.047) 214.2 (24.12) 6.91 (0.218) 
NE 52.4 (14.32) 1.69 (0.13) 525.6 (56.47) 16.96 (0.511) 
NH 49.9 (9.32) 1.61 (0.084) 80.6 (13.73) 2.6 (0.124) 
NJ 13 (2.63) 0.42 (0.024) 16.8 (11.33) 0.54 (0.103) 
NM 23.8 (8.07) 0.77 (0.073) 240 (30.81) 7.74 (0.279) 
NV 6.3 (6.96) 0.2 (0.063) 172.7 (24.64) 5.57 (0.223) 
NY 8.6 (3.78) 0.28 (0.034) 20.7 (17.32) 0.67 (0.157) 
OH 31.7 (7.86) 1.02 (0.071) 185.9 (26.30) 6 (0.238) 
OK 30.1 (6.23) 0.97 (0.056) 444.6 (47.68) 14.34 (0.431) 
OR 1.6 (7.67) 0.05 (0.069) 143.4 (20.04) 4.63 (0.181) 
PA 20.3 (7.56) 0.65 (0.068) 34.1 (19.68) 1.1 (0.178) 
RI 12.7 (2.56) 0.41 (0.023) 10.4 (4.96) 0.33 (0.045) 
SC 35.9 (4.51) 1.16 (0.041) 96 (10.45) 3.1 (0.095) 
SD 70.8 (21.84) 2.28 (0.198) 420 (49.68) 13.55 (0.449) 
TN 34.8 (13.23) 1.12 (0.12) 342.2 (40.86) 11.04 (0.37) 
TX 24.2 (11.91) 0.78 (0.108) 168.5 (20.00) 5.44 (0.181) 
UT 10.4 (7.20) 0.33 (0.065) 228.5 (26.57) 7.37 (0.24) 
VA 34.2 (8.31) 1.1 (0.075) 122.6 (19.00) 3.96 (0.172) 
VT 65.1 (13.25) 2.1 (0.12) 58.9 (16.08) 1.9 (0.145) 
WA 20.2 (6.84) 0.65 (0.062) 98.6 (11.24) 3.18 (0.102) 
WI 28.7 (9.29) 0.93 (0.084) 212.3 (28.65) 6.85 (0.259) 
WV 13.5 (6.21) 0.44 (0.056) 80.3 (19.50) 2.59 (0.176) 
WY 13.6 (7.01) 0.44 (0.063) 359.4 (41.15) 11.59 (0.372) 
Simple National Average 29.25 0.94 197.95 6.39 
Simple National Std.Dev 18.64 0.60 141.88 4.58 
Weighted National Avg. 31.55 (10.48) 1.02 (0.095) 247.4 (30.52) 7.98 (0.276) 
Approximated standard errors in parentheses. 
The estimated own state (
∧
r ) and social ( ) IRRs consistent with Model 2 for 
each state are reported in Table 5 and Figures 3 through 6, along with their 95% 
confidence intervals. The highest average own state IRR corresponds to Maine and 
equals 23.18%, while the lowest corresponds to Oregon and equals 2%. The simple 
average own state IRR for the nation is 16% with a standard deviation across states of 
4.51%. The weighted average own state IRR for the nation is 16.5%, with a 95% 
1
∧
r
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 confidence interval ranging from 8.6% to 19.8%. In all states but California, Maryland 
and Maine (states where the own state IRR could not be estimated in Model 1), the own 
state IRR from Model 2 is significantly lower than that from Model 1. 36   
These estimates are consistent with the estimates of returns to investments in 
public agricultural R&D and extension by Lu, Cline and Quance (25%), White and 
Havlicek (7-36%), Evenson (11-45%), Oehmke (11.6%), and Alston, Craig and Pardey 
(7-31%). However, they are significantly lower than the rates estimated in most other 
studies. Evenson (2001) reports IRRs to aggregate public sector agricultural research (not 
including extension) from several studies ranging from 25% to 212%.  
The social IRRs from Model 2 range from 11.26% in Rhode Island to 37.09% in 
Missouri. The simple national average is 27% and its standard deviation across states is 
6.56%. The weighted national average is 29.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is  
[26.5% ; 31.1%]. The social IRRs are lower in Model 2 than in Model 1 for all states 
except for Maine (state for which the social IRR could not be calculated in Model 1).  
These are significant differences as indicated by the non-overlapping confidence 
intervals. The social IRRs obtained from Models 1 are, on average, 14% higher than the 
ones estimated with Model 2. 
Our estimates of the social IRRs, once correction has been made for stochastic 
spatial dependency, even though impressive relative to market returns of private 
investments, are significantly lower than those calculated by Evenson (1989), Huffman 
and Evenson (1993, 2006), and Yee et al (2002).  These authors estimate rates between 
49% and 600%.  
                                                 
36 Mean difference of 12.8% and a standard deviation of 4.6%. 
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 Table 5. Own state (
∧
r ) and social ( ) IRRs, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2)  1
∧
r
95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
State ∧r  1
∧
r  State 
∧
r  1
∧
r  State 
∧
r  1
∧
r  
AL 18.01 [15.7;19.7] 
25.91 
[24.0;27.4] MD 
2.78 
[n/a;7.2] 
20.74 
[15.7;23.6] OR 
1.99 
[n/a;13.9] 
26.9 
[24.7;28.6] 
AR 20.28 [13.9;23.5] 
32.53 
[30.4;34.3] ME 
23.18 
[20.4;25.2] 
22.4 
[18.9;24.7] PA 
14.9 
[7.7;18.1] 
17.88 
[n/a;22.5] 
AZ 11.88 [7.8;14.2] 
29.14 
[27.2;30.7] MI 
17.12 
[12.6;19.7] 
30.61 
[28.3;32.4] RI 
12.33 
[9.6;14.2] 
11.26 
[n/a;14.9] 
CA 13.97 [n/a;18.2] 
24.13 
[22.2;25.7] MN 
20.42 
[15.7;23.2] 
32.45 
[30.5;34.0] SC 
18.18 
[16.5;19.5] 
24.24 
[22.7;25.5] 
CO 15.13 [10.1;17.8] 
34.01 
[32.1;35.6] MO 
20.36 
[11.4;24.0] 
37.09 
[35.1;38.7] SD 
22.3 
[16.6;25.4] 
34.66 
[32.6;36.3] 
CT 13.04 [10.6;14.7] 
12.42 
[n/a;17.1] MS 
14.12 
[10.2;16.5] 
28.24 
[26.6;29.6] TN 
17.99 
[10.1;21.4] 
33.1 
[31.1;34.7] 
DE 17.73 [13.4;20.3] 
17.12 
[6.7;20.8] MT 
17.12 
[14.3;19.1] 
30.24 
[28.5;31.7] TX 
15.89 
[n/a;19.9] 
28.01 
[26.2;29.5] 
FL 15.36 [13.1;17.0] 
21.75 
[19.9;23.2] NC 
20.79 
[18.2;22.7] 
28.27 
[26.5;29.7] UT 
11.27 
[n/a;16.0] 
30.14 
[28.3;31.7] 
GA 17.41 [14.5;19.4] 
27.61 
[25.5;29.2] ND 
17.19 
[14.8;18.9] 
29.68 
[27.9;31.1] VA 
17.89 
[14.1;20.3] 
25.85 
[23.4;27.7] 
IA 18.38 [n/a;22.5] 
34.1 
[32.1;35.7] NE 
20.44 
[15.8;23.2] 
36.41 
[34.5;38.0] VT 
21.77 
[18.6;23.9] 
21.16 
[16.5;23.9] 
ID 17.45 [13.8;19.7] 
30.07 
[28.2;31.6] NH 
20.15 
[17.4;22.1] 
23.12 
[20.5;25.0] WA 
14.89 
[8.9;17.8] 
24.42 
[22.8;25.8] 
IL 12.19 [n/a;17.0] 
33.44 
[31.4;35.1] NJ 
12.46 
[9.7;14.3] 
13.86 
[n/a;18.7] WI 
16.87 
[11.1;19.8] 
29.62 
[27.4;31.3] 
IN 17.02 [11.7;19.9] 
28.58 
[26.4;30.3] NM 
15.81 
[9.7;18.8] 
30.49 
[28.4;32.2] WV 
12.69 
[0.5;16.3] 
23.1 
[19.0;25.7] 
KS 21.5 [17.6;24.0] 
32.43 
[30.7;33.9] NV 
8.68 
[n/a;14.9] 
28.17 
[25.9;29.9] WY 
12.71 
[n/a;16.7] 
33.47 
[31.5;35.0] 
KY 13 [n/a;17.8] 
33.29 
[31.2;35.0] NY 
10.31 
[0.3;13.7] 
15.02 
[n/a;20.8] SNA 
15.69 
[9.7;18.8] 
26.95 
[23.1;29.1] 
LA 7.97 [n/a;12.0] 
27.53 
[25.7;29.0] OH 
17.45 
[13.6;19.8] 
28.68 
[26.4;30.4] 
MA 15.46 [12.9;17.3] 
15.26 
[n/a;19.9] OK 
17.15 
[14.1;19.2] 
35.1 
[33.3;36.6] 
WNA 16.54 [8.6;19.8] 
29.31 
[26.5;29.3] 
Note: n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative. SNA: Simple 
National Average. WNA: Weighted National Average*The bounds of the confidence intervals for the 
National Averages are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states. 
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 Figure 3. Histogram of the own state IRR’s (
∧
r ) - Model 2. 
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Figure 4. Histogram of the social IRR’s ( ) - Model 2. 1
∧
r
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 Figure 5. Own state IRR’s to public agricultural R&D – Model 2 
 
References: Red: r = 0-10% ;Yellow: r = 10-20%; Blue: r > 20% 
 
 
Figure 6. Social IRR’s to public agricultural R&D expenditures – Model 2 
 
 
References: Yellow: r = 10-20%; Blue: r = 20-30%; Orange: r > 30% 
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 Huffman et al. (2002), the only other study of this nature that is publically 
available, obtain estimates for the Midwestern states.  For comparison purposes we 
calculate a simple average and a weighted average of our estimates for the states of 
Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana.  The simple and weighted average own 
state IRRs for the Midwestern states, 18% and 17.32% 37 respectively, are higher than the 
11% in their study. Our simple and weighted social IRR for the Midwestern states are 
approximately 33%38 figures that are lower than the “significantly higher than 40%” 
reported in their paper.39  
 
5. Conclusions 
The present study is an attempt at providing a quantitative assessment of the 
returns to public agricultural R&D investments during the last five decades in the United 
States.  This is done first by deriving the returns to a local public good from a theoretical 
model of firm behavior using the concept of virtual prices, then showing how to measure 
them when no information is available on market rates of return. Our method explicitly 
acknowledges for the spillover effects of these investments by incorporating them 
structurally and stochastically in the model and by allowing endogenous derivation of 
virtual prices, own and social.  The objective is to use these estimates in calculating 
marginal internal rates of return to the use of public monies on R&D investments in 
agriculture.  The study uses a data set of inputs and outputs developed by Craig, Pardey 
and Acquaye for specific use in productivity analysis combined with R&D stocks built 
                                                 
37 The 95% confidence interval is [5.98%; 21.14%] 
38 The 95% confidence interval is [31.21; 34.91]. 
39 Our estimates of the average elasticity of cost with respect to the stock of public R&D in these states is -
5%, lower than the -87% estimated in their study.  
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 following Evenson’s inverted-V lag structure.  Discussions on the size of returns to R&D 
investments in U.S. agriculture are even more important given the international food 
crisis and in light of the proposed cuts in federal monies.  
The own state internal rate of return we estimate is, on average for the nation, 
17%.  The social internal rate of return we estimate is, on average for the nation, 29%. 
Knowledge spillovers are important in agriculture and an attempt at capturing all 
information structurally and stochastically should be considered.  After adjusting for 
stochastic spatial effects, the returns to agricultural investments in R&D in the United 
States have been impressive, although our estimates are lower than estimates for the 
Midwest by Huffman.  In this sense, this study provides evidence in support of Alston 
and Pardey’s (2001) assertion that “improper attribution of locational spillovers generates 
high and very variable estimates of the rate of return to agricultural research.” 
Although not a primary focus of this analysis, our study has also found that in 
aggregate U.S. agriculture, technical change induced by public agricultural R&D has 
been biased towards the use of capital and purchased inputs and against the use of labor.  
We also found evidence of potential long term impacts of public R&D investments on 
long run growth of the sector.  The capacity to generate growth endogenously and 
perpetually through public investments in R&D makes this an important policy tool.  This 
is an even more important insight when faced with the alternative use of food crops for 
biofuels and the implication for food prices and the federal government’s potential 
reductions in budget for agricultural research and development.  
A number of important shortcomings of this analysis should be mentioned.  First, 
we know of updated an improved aggregates, in particular for capital, being worked out 
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 by Andersen, Alston and Pardey.  Presumably these would be better to use in the analysis 
but the data is not yet available for public use. Second, given the growing importance of 
private investments in agricultural R&D we might err by attributing benefits to public 
investments that might have been the result of private investments.  We hope that the 
quality adjustments included by Craig, Pardey and Acquaye in the painstaking job of 
constructing the output and input indexes are enough to diminish the impact of this 
potential flaw. We would expect that the appropriable benefits of private research are 
embodied in the input aggregates used and therefore effectively captured in this study. 
Similarly, the omission of the extension services, the stock of infrastructure and of 
international spillovers might also render our estimates upward biased. Third, our 
analysis is static, and assumes naïve expectation formation in production and decision 
making, all these compromising our estimates.  
All in all even if we provide estimates of the rate of return to public R&D in 
agriculture lower than previously suggested, an average return of 29% on public funds is 
still impressive compared to the 9% and 12% average returns of the S&P500 and 
NASDAQ composite indexes during the same period.  
 38
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 Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables pooled through time and states. 
Variable  Units N   Mean  Std Dev  Minimum Maximum 
Output Quantity (1949=100) 2064 145.51 55.88 62.65 418.68 
Land Quantity (1949=100) 2064 84.56 20.34 23.63 122.88 
Labor Quantity (1949=100) 2064 59.49 21.22 16.68 100.99 
Capital Quantity (1949=100) 2064 121.47 33.32 40.72 302.30 
Purchased Inputs Quantity (1949=100) 2064 179.36 85.60 39.08 562.24 
Expenditures in  
Land in 1949 $1,000 48 132,515 116,648 2,119 529,117 
Expenditures in  
Labor in 1949 $1,000 48 303,343 217,003 11,909 931,771 
Expenditures in  
Capital in 1949 $1,000 48 177,403 143,910 8,546 526,525 
Expenditures in  
Purchased Inputs in 1949 $1,000 48 140,533 115,487 8,641 534,242 
Total Value of  
Agricultural Output in 1949 $1,000 48 620,240 566,447 21,858 2,399,574 
Source: Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey (2003). 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis pooled through time and 
states. 
Variable  Units N   Mean   Std Dev  Minimum Maximum
wM (1949=100) 2064       201  117 94 593
wL (1949=100) 2064       446  328 95 1415
wK (1949=100) 2064       207  115 84 483
SHM Proportion of the Variable 
Cost 2064    0.3882 0.1182 0.1455 0.8195
SHL Proportion of the Variable 
Cost 2064    0.2810 0.0986 0.0623 0.6594
SHK Proportion of the Variable 
Cost 2064    0.3307 0.0651 0.1182 0.5300
T $1,000 
(constant 1949 dollars) 2064   122,989 118897 587 532774
y $1,000 
(constant 1949 dollars) 2064   920,314 905341 14694 5631427
G $1,000 
(constant 1949 dollars) 2064     1,729  1943 99 16624
S $1,000 
(constant 1949 dollars) 2064     7,649  5979 138 31426
c $1,000 
(constant 1949 dollars) 2064   664,066 545272 10702 3183774
Sources: G and S are based on author’s calculations. All other variables are from 
Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey (2003). 
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 Appendix 2. Model 1: Full model with no SAR error structure 
 
Method of estimation: ITSUR 
Parameters in the model: 174 
Linear Restrictions: 55 
Parameters Estimated: 119 
Method: Gauss 
Number of Iterations: 50 
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE=0.001 Criteria Met 
Observations Processed: 2064 
 
Equation     DF Model DF Error R-Square Adj. R-Sq. AIC 
ln c 83.11 1981 0.8084 0.8004 0.24942 
SHM 17.94 2046 0.9376 0.9371 0.001031 
SHK 17.94 2046 0.8034 0.8017 0.000985 
System R-Square: 0.896487    
 
Parameter Estimates: 
Parameter Estimate SE T-value Parameter Estimate SE T-value 
δT 1.661054 0.1796 9.25 βKY -0.03839 0.00509 -7.54 
δY -1.03266 0.2336 -4.42 βTY 0.144139 0.0386 3.73 
δG 0.439636 0.2601 1.69 βMG 0.009626 0.00415 2.32 
βMK 0.067766 0.00568 11.93 βLG -0.01025 0.00386 -2.65 
βMT -0.01813 0.00601 -3.02 βKG 0.000619 0.00377 0.16 
βMY 0.124598 0.00561 22.21 βTG 0.014571 0.0281 0.52 
βLK 0.037924 0.00415 9.14 βYG -0.09133 0.0463 -1.97 
βLT 0.068861 0.00575 11.98 βGS -0.24097 0.021 -11.46 
βLY -0.08621 0.0052 -16.56 βML 0.081212 0.00325 24.98 
βLL -0.11914 0.00352 -33.87 βMS 0.034992 0.00415 8.43 
βMM -0.14898 0.00501 -29.71 βLS -0.03773 0.00387 -9.75 
βKK -0.10569 0.00835 -12.66 βKS 0.002742 0.00388 0.71 
βTT -0.19386 0.0293 -6.62 βTS -0.16861 0.0162 -10.39 
βYY -0.07296 0.0644 -1.13 βGG 0.31271 0.0374 8.35 
βKT -0.05074 0.00559 -9.07 βYS 0.239682 0.0181 13.25 
Parameters estimates of dummy variables are not reported but could be obtained from the 
authors. 
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 Appendix 3. Model 2. Full model with SAR error structure. 
Method of estimation: ITSUR 
Parameters in the model: 174 
Linear Restrictions: 55 
Parameters Estimated: 119 
Method: Gauss 
Number of Iterations: 41 
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE=0.001 Criteria Met 
Observations Processed: 2064 
 
Equation  
DF 
Model 
DF 
Error R-Square Adj.R-Sq. AIC 
ln c* 83.11 1981 0.9324 0.9296 0.06615 
SHM* 17.94 2046 0.926 0.9254 0.000611 
SHK* 17.94 2046 0.8904 0.8895 0.000418 
System R-Square: 0.911236    
* Transformed variables. 
 
Parameter Estimate SE T-value Parameter Estimate SE T-value
δT 1.007875 0.1101 9.15 βKY -0.05499 0.00384 -14.33 
δY -0.35228 0.1432 -2.46 βTY -0.07576 0.0204 -3.71 
δG -0.40512 0.1617 -2.51 βMG 0.013477 0.00299 4.51 
βMK 0.074332 0.00888 8.37 βLG -0.01807 0.0026 -6.95 
βMT -0.03649 0.00736 -4.96 βKG 0.004589 0.0026 1.77 
βMY 0.135337 0.00451 30.02 βTG 0.035987 0.0166 2.17 
βLK 0.070494 0.00739 9.54 βYG -0.04832 0.0268 -1.80 
βLT 0.076869 0.00634 12.12 βGS 0.035599 0.0132 2.69 
βLY -0.08035 0.00378 -21.25 βML 0.058759 0.0058 10.14 
βLL -0.12925 0.0072 -17.95 βMS 0.040074 0.00347 11.54 
βMM -0.13309 0.00907 -14.68 βLS -0.03284 0.00329 -9.99 
βKK -0.14483 0.0119 -12.20 βKS -0.00724 0.00342 -2.12 
βTT 0.03303 0.0156 2.12 βTS -0.05169 0.0096 -5.39 
βYY 0.161682 0.0351 4.61 βGG 0.039228 0.0207 1.89 
βKT -0.04038 0.00602 -6.70 βYS 0.020784 0.0104 2.00 
The parameters corresponding to dummy variables are not reported but could be obtained 
from the authors. 
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